

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA**

BLUEFIELD DIVISION

ROBERT NEUNZ,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	Civil Action No. 1:13-14151
)	
STEVENS CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al.,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

On June 12, 2013, Plaintiff, acting *pro se* and incarcerated at Stevens Correctional Center, filed his Complaint in this matter claiming entitlement to relief pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ (Document No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Warden Dennis Dingus is improperly denying him placement in a vocational training program. (*Id.*) Specifically, Plaintiff states as follows:

There are no vocational classes which would benefit me once I'm paroled or discharge my sentence. Mr. Dingus is the Warden here at this facility and I believe it is his job to make sure there are classes to benefit the inmates currently housed here. Every other D.O.C. facility has vocational classes. The only class here is the mining class and I already have my 80 hour mining certificate.

(*Id.*, pp. 4 - 5.) Plaintiff requests that the Court “investigate why this facility refuses to offer vocational classes.” (*Id.*, p. 5.)

STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to screen each case in which a

¹ Because Plaintiff is acting *pro se*, the documents which he has filed are held to a less stringent standard than if they were prepared by a lawyer and therefore, they are construed liberally. *See Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. On screening, the Court must recommend dismissal of the case if the complaint is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A “frivolous” complaint is one which is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). A “frivolous” claim lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831 - 32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id., 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id., 490 U.S. at 327 - 328, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. A complaint therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted factually when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. With these standards in mind, the Court will assess Plaintiff’s allegations in view of applicable law.

DISCUSSION

“[F]ederal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of all “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].” Thus, Section 1983 provides a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Generally speaking, to state and prevail upon a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Plaintiff must prove that (1) a person acting under color of State law (2) committed an act which deprived him of an alleged right, privilege

or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1996), requires that inmates exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing civil actions though the administrative process may not afford them the relief they might obtain through civil proceedings.² Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2382-83, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002)(The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1820,149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001)(“Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing the inmate’s complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not make specific provision for monetary relief.”). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is also required when injunctive relief is requested. Goist v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 2002 WL 32079467, *4, fn.1 (D.S.C. Sep 25, 2002), *aff’d*, 54 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir. 2003), *cert. denied*, 538 U.S. 1047, 123 S.Ct. 2111, 155 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2003). “[T]here is no futility exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.” Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1999). But the plain language of the statute requires that only “available” administrative remedies be exhausted. A grievance procedure is not “available” if prison officials prevent an

² 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides as follows:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correction facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

inmate from using it. Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003)(inmate lacked available administrative remedies for exhaustion purposes where inmate was unable to file a grievance because prison officials refused to provide him with the necessary grievance forms); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001)(allegations that prison officials failed to respond to his written requests for grievance forms were sufficient to raise an inference that inmate had exhausted his available administrative remedies.)

If an inmate exhausts administrative remedies with respect to some, but not all, of the claims he raises in a Section 1983, Bivens or FTCA action, the Court must dismiss the unexhausted claims and proceed with the exhausted ones. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 913, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007)(“The PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire complaint when a prisoner has failed to exhaust some, but not all, of the claims included in the complaint. * * * If a complaint contains both good and bad claims, the court proceeds with the good and leaves the bad.”) It appears to be the majority view as well that exhausting administrative remedies after a Complaint is filed will not save a case from dismissal. See Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2001)(*overruled on other grounds*), a Section 1983 action, citing numerous cases. The rationale is pragmatic. As the Court stated in Neal, allowing prisoner suits to proceed, so long as the inmate eventually fulfills the exhaustion requirement, undermines Congress’ directive to pursue administrative remedies prior to filing a complaint in federal court. Moreover, if during the pendency of a suit, the administrative process were to produce results benefitting plaintiff, the federal court would have wasted its resources adjudicating claims that could have been resolved within the prison grievance system at the

outset. Neal, 267 F.3d at 123. In Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999), the Court stated: “The plain language of the statute [§ 1997e(a)] makes exhaustion a precondition to filing an action in federal Court.. . .The prisoner, therefore, may not exhaust administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit.” Thus, the PLRA requires that available administrative remedies must be exhausted before the filing of a suit in Federal Court. It is further clear that the PLRA does not require that an inmate allege or demonstrate that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. See Jones v. Bock, *supra*; Anderson v. XYZ Correctional Health Services, 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. Prison officials have the burden of proving that the inmate had available remedies which he did not exhaust. See Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004)(“Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition to a federal prisoner filing a Bivens suit, [citations omitted] failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that the defendants have the burden of pleading and proving.” (Citations omitted)) The Court is not precluded, however, from considering at the outset whether an inmate has exhausted administrative remedies. The Fourth Circuit stated in Anderson, 470 F.3d at 683, as follows:

[A]n inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by the defendant. That exhaustion is an affirmative defense, however, does not preclude the district court from dismissing a complaint where the failure to exhaust is apparent from the face of the complaint, nor does it preclude the district court from inquiring on its own motion into whether the inmate exhausted all administrative remedies.

The West Virginia Division of Corrections’ Policy Directive 335.00 establishes procedures whereby state inmates may seek review of complaints which relate to any aspect of their imprisonment. Within 15 days after the circumstances occurred which are the subject of the inmate’s complaints, the inmate must submit a G-1 Grievance Form to the Unit Manager. The

Unit Manager must respond to the inmate's Grievance within five business days. If the Unit Manager's response is unfavorable, the inmate may appeal within five working days to the Warden/Administrator by filing a G-2 Grievance Form. The Warden/Administrator must respond to the appeal, in writing, within five working days. If the Warden/Administrator, in his/her discretion, determines that an investigation is warranted, a final response shall be made to the inmate within 30 working days. If the Warden/Administrator's response is unfavorable, the inmate may appeal within five working days to the Commissioner/designee of the Division of Corrections. The Commissioner must respond to the appeal within ten working days. The administrative process is exhausted when the Commissioner responds to the inmate's final appeal. The entire process takes about 60 days to complete.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies. (Document No. 1, p. 3.) Plaintiff contends that he "was told [his claim] wasn't a grievable issue." (*Id.*) As stated above, the West Virginia Division of Corrections' Policy Directive 335.00 establishes procedures whereby state inmates may seek review of complaints that relate to any aspect of their imprisonment. Clearly, Plaintiff's claim that he was being denied appropriate vocational training is exactly the type of complaints covered by the grievance process. The undersigned, therefore, recommends that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed in view of his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the undersigned will briefly consider the merits of Plaintiff's claims.

2. No Due Process Violation.

To determine whether an inmate retains a certain liberty interest, the Court must look to the nature of the claimed interest and determine whether the Due Process Clause applies. See

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705-06, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). An inmate holds a protectable right in those interests to which he has a legitimate claim of entitlement. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2103, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979)(quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2709). In Gaston, the Fourth Circuit determined that an inmate possesses a claim of entitlement in those interests “which were not taken away expressly or by implication, in the original sentence to confinement.” Id. at 343. The Supreme Court held in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), that in order to show the deprivation of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, an inmate must show either that: (1) the conditions exceed the sentence imposed in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause or (2) the confinement creates an atypical or significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id., 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 (citations omitted). Absent allegations indicating that there has been a restraint upon the inmate’s freedom which imposes “an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” the inmate’s claims have no merit. Id.

To the extent Plaintiff alleges a liberty interest in obtaining vocational training during his imprisonment, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s claim is without merit. The denial of privileges are matters clearly contemplated by Plaintiff’s original sentence. See Gaston, 946 F.2d at 343 (To safely and efficiently run the prison, prison officials maintain broad discretion over an inmate’s “location, variations of daily routines, changes in conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation), and the denial of privileges”); Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d. 846, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(stating that “the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more

restrictive quarter for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence”); and Gholson v. Murry, 953 F. Supp. 709, 716 (E.D.Va. 1997)(finding that the denial of work opportunities and certain education programs did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on inmates placed in segregation in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life). Furthermore, it is well established that an inmate has no absolute right to placement in a vocational training program. See Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571-72(7th Cir. 2000)(finding no liberty interest in attending educational or vocational classes to earn good conduct credit); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985)(finding no liberty or property interest in vocational training); McNeal v. Mayberg, 2008 WL 5114650 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 4, 2008)(“Because Plaintiff has neither a liberty interest nor a property interest in vocational placement, Plaintiff was not entitled to any procedural due process protections in conjunction with her vocational training/placement opportunities, or lack thereof.”); Smith v. Michigan Dept. Of Corrections, 2007 WL 1582223 (W.D.Mich. May 31, 2007)(finding that “prisoners have no recognized liberty or property interest in prison vocational or educational programs”). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s claim that his liberty interest in being placed in a vocational program was violated to be without merit.

PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION

The undersigned therefore respectfully **PROPOSES** that the District Court confirm and accept the foregoing findings and **RECOMMENDS** that the District Court **DISMISS** Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document No. 1.) and remove this matter from the Court’s docket.


The Plaintiff is hereby notified that this “Proposed Findings and Recommendation” is hereby **FILED**, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable United States District Judge

David A. Faber. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Rule 6(d) and 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff shall have seventeen (17) days (fourteen days, filing of objections and three days, mailing/service) from the date of filing of this Findings and Recommendation within which to file with the Clerk of this Court specific written objections identifying the portions of the Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted for good cause.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of *de novo* review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984). Copies of such objections shall be served on opposing parties, District Judge Faber and this Magistrate Judge.

The Clerk is requested to send a copy of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation to Plaintiff, who is acting *pro se*, and transmit a copy to counsel of record.

Date: May 2, 2016.


Omar J. Aboulhosn
United States Magistrate Judge